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Abstract: 
 
The public debate about the consequences of Brexit in Britain follows certain predictable 
lines of established academic concepts in British constitutional law. This arguably overlooks 
important constitutional complications of Brexit, including the position of Scotland in post-
Brexit Britain. This article takes the unorthodox approach of focusing on legal and intellectual 
history rather than British constitutional law, because in this way one obtains a better 
understanding of the present British constitutional framework in the context of Europe. The 
discussion is from a continental European viewpoint and through the eyes of a private and 
commercial lawyer. The completely different understanding of Britain and Europe about the 
nature of a constitution and the structure of a state becomes more apparent with Britain’s 
departure from the EU, which may also influence the future national cohesion of the UK 
itself, particularly the relationship between England and Scotland after Brexit. 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The legal problems which the United Kingdom will have to deal with when leaving 
the European Union are usually discussed from the perspective of British lawyers, and 
confined to legal questions of the future trade relationship between the UK and the 
EU, the situation of EU citizens in the UK, the Irish border, the financial settlement 
with the EU following Brexit, the legal possibility of reversing the withdrawal under 
Art. 50 of the Treaty of the European Union, and so on. The academic voice of 
Europeans in the public Brexit debate in Britain is entirely absent, and the legal 
discussion on Brexit follows certain predictable lines of established academic 
concepts of British constitutional law. This arguably overlooks important 
constitutional complications of Brexit, particularly in relation to the position of 
Scotland in post-Brexit Britain. One obtains a better understanding of the present 
British constitutional framework in the context of Europe if one sees it from the 
position of legal and intellectual history. 
Therefore this article takes an unorthodox approach. It is not about 
constitutional law as conventionally understood. It rather focuses on legal and 
intellectual history, comparative law and particularly property theory, and it looks at 
the British constitution and the challenges Brexit poses from the outside, that is, from 
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a continental European viewpoint and from the position of European intellectual and 
constitutional history. Furthermore, the perspective taken is primarily not that of a 
public lawyer, but of a private and commercial lawyer looking at constitutional issues. 
In a globalised world of transnational trade and international commercial law the 
traditional idea of the nation state which the disciplines of public law or constitutional 
law still adhere to becomes less and less important. Many phenomena of the modern 
legal world, also within the classical domain of public law, can nowadays only be 
explained with an analysis of the rules and institutions of commercial law, not 
traditional public law. In some respects the evolution has come full circle, because the 
private law or property law element in what we call public law or constitutional law 
today was central to the feudal system in historical times. And that leads seamlessly to 
the British constitution and its struggles with Brexit. 
Brexit engages commercial lawyers and public lawyers alike. Whether or not 
the referendum of 23 June 2016 was an accidental slip into popular sovereignty 
against the age-old constitutional convention of parliamentary sovereignty1 is unclear. 
In any event, the result of the slight majority of 52% of the British people in favour of 
Britain’s departure from the European Union became ‘the will of the people’ and 
gospel for parliamentarians. The dictate of the majority already astonished Alexis de 
Tocqueville in his study of US democracy:2 so the minority of 48% were apparently 
not the ‘people’, nor even the majority of the Scots and Irish in Northern Ireland who 
voted against Brexit,3 and judges upholding parliamentary sovereignty in R. (Miller) 
v. S of State for Exiting the EU4 were even the ‘enemies of the people’ for some.5 At 
least at that stage ‘the people’ became a populist battle cry with fascist leanings.6 
In any event, the UK never really understood the principal idea of the 
European Union which all EU measures and structures ultimately have to sustain:7 
never ever war between France and Germany and never ever war between Member 
States generally. Britain had little interest for that. EU membership really meant a 
pragmatic use of the common market which was considered as expedient.8 In the UK, 
overregulation and excessive legal harmonisation were often regarded as 
objectionable because they may have impeded the free single (financial) market that 
the UK traditionally championed, or because they may have hurt nationalistic 
feelings. It was never a British concern that over-synchronization could damage the 
European project itself: for the more one pursues integration, harmonisation and 
unification of national laws across Europe, the more one imperils the framework of a 
union of European states. Further legal unification prompts a tendency of the EU 
Member States to move away from one another in conflict with the EU agenda, 
something I called elsewhere the ‘Herderian paradox’, 9  after Johann Gottfried 
Herder’s idea of diverse cultural unity of humanity.10 But the UK never had much 
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comprehension of such ideas. Furthermore, Britain is not a Euro or a Schengen 
country, so that these issues did not play a great role in the Brexit referendum. 
The most important reason for the success of the Brexit supporters in the 
referendum was not the EU and its possible failings, but ‘immigration’, or more 
accurately, the whipping up of xenophobia and racism in the Brexit campaign. The 
government was quick to adopt this ‘immigration’ interpretation of the Brexit 
referendum result.11 Other possible causes for its outcome, dissatisfaction with the 
central government in London, the establishment (although parts of that establishment 
instigated Brexit), or with austerity, have had no decisive importance in the Brexit 
debate before or after the referendum. In relation to the hostility towards foreigners 
Britain and many EU countries have become more similar than ever before, curiously 
at a point in time when Britain wants to leave the EU. An even more sinister aspect of 
this xenophobia is that it is only ostensibly directed against Europeans, while it may 
also affect everyone in Britain with a British passport who may not be considered as 
properly English, like ethnic minorities or Scots, Welsh and Irish. A statement from a 
businessman quoted in a newspaper report soon after the Brexit referendum in June 
2016 is probably more representative than one wishes to acknowledge: ‘So what does 
he think of the Scots voting overwhelmingly to remain? “I hope we ditch them from 
the UK. I hope they do get another independence vote and we can get rid of them. 
And the Welsh. Then we can just be England. That’s what people wanted – England 
back.”’12  Thus in this political climate, by no means discouraged by the present 
government, the Scots and the Welsh could find themselves being no longer 
considered a full part of Britain after Brexit, but inhabitants of a subordinated 
province. 
After somewhat lurching initial Brexit negotiations, the European Council 
could conclude in December 2017 that in relation to the preliminary negotiation 
issues – EU citizens’ and British expats’ rights after Brexit, financial settlement on 
severance, Irish border after Brexit – sufficient progress has been made to move to the 
second and definitive phase of negotiations related to transition and the framework for 
the future relationship between the UK and the EU.13 There is nevertheless a strange 
contradiction in the Brexit endeavour. The discussions of a trade treaty between the 
UK and the EU require co-operation to agree a ‘non-close co-operation’ treaty that 
stipulates the UK as a direct economic competitor to the EU in the future. It is a co-
operation treaty not to co-operate – how that should come about is mysterious. In 
contrast, all conventional (free) trade agreements seek to align the parties’ wishes and 
to compromise, as any contract: to agree not to have future special relations appears 
like a negotiation for negotiation’s sake, and the EU should better prepare and provide 
for the realistic situation of a breakdown of the talks.14 For the EU Brexit is primarily 
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about damage control,15 and, rather than protracted negotiations with an uncertain 
outcome, a collapse of the talks can create decisive certainty that may limit more 
clearly the economic damage for the EU. There is however still the possibility of a 
complete stalemate, so that Brexit effectively does not happen or gets watered down 
because especially the British government may be overwhelmed by the gargantuan 
task ahead for its legal and administrative negotiating teams.16 A small example from 
intellectual property law may illustrate that:17 
After several failed attempts, the EU established a patent with unitary effect in 
2012.18 But this unitary patent package19 is not comparable to the already existing 
EU-wide EU trade mark law20 and the community designs law,21 but a conglomerate 
of existing and newly created international law treaties which are not EU law. The 
substantive law on patentability remains the European Patent Convention (EPC) 
1973,22 a (non-EU law) treaty of which the UK most likely remains a member. The 
new EU patent court system is based on the Agreement on a Unified Patent (UPC 
Agreement) court, an intergovernmental treaty between EU Member States outside 
EU law. 23  This new EU patent system is created by allowing the voluntary 
transformation of EPC patents into patents with unitary effect or uniform protection in 
the participating EU Member States (Ref. 18, p. 936).24 The unitary patent protection 
is however not autonomous but based on the Member States’ national laws25 and the 
EPC. 26  The EU-Regulation establishing the unitary patent protection through 
enhanced cooperation27 is an EU-mantle which gives the non-EU instruments the 
effect of EU legislation. 
The fact that much of the harmonised substantive patent law is technically not 
EU law may make it possible that the UK could retain some benefits of European 
patent law. However, the future Unified Patent Court will apply laws that are at least 
based on EU-Regulations. Therefore referrals to, and reviews by, the Court of Justice 
(CJEU) of the European Union will be possible and likely. But the UK government 
seeks to maintain that the UK will no longer be subject to the CJEU’s jurisdiction 
after Brexit. 28  Furthermore, the implementation of the unified patent package 
presupposes EU membership,29 even though the substantive patent law is in the EPC 
and the EU patent court structure is based on the UPC Agreement which are both not 
EU law. Contrary to the usual political line on Brexit, in December 2016 the UK 
government expressed the intention to ratify the UPC Agreement, despite its efforts to 
leave the EU.30 The British negotiating team will struggle to find a solution to these 
inconsistencies. 
But there is another neglected great problem which the Brexit negotiations 
highlight: there is a completely different understanding between Britain and Europe 
about the nature of a constitution and the structure of a state.31 These, ultimately 
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irreconcilable, differences were not so relevant during Britain’s EU membership but 
come to the fore with Britain’s departure, and they may also influence the future 
national cohesion of the UK itself, particularly the relationship between England and 
Scotland after Brexit. That is what this article will discuss. 
The article consists of two parts. The first part discusses the present unwritten 
British constitution, a feudal constitution of an ancien régime, and its ability to adapt 
to all kinds of political systems, though not necessarily democratic ones – a 
phenomenon that becomes more apparent under the tension of Brexit. The second part 
is devoted to the possible situation of Scotland in the UK after Brexit: it demonstrates 
that the current constitutional settlement of devolution for Scotland, effectively an 
inchoate or asymmetrical federal framework, is difficult to sustain in the ultimately 
feudal British constitutional system that is necessarily centralist. Within the EU that 
was less relevant, but after departure from the EU this will be a politically and legally 
important issue, and new constitutional arrangements for the future relationship 
between Scotland and Britain or for possible Scottish independence are suggested. 
 
 
2 The Real British Constitution and the Situation after Departure from the 
European Union 
 
a) An unwritten constitution of the Ancien Régime 
Here the position is maintained, perhaps controversially, that the United Kingdom 
does not only have an unwritten constitution (Ref. 1, p. 8-12),32 but no constitution at 
all as a modern political and legal system would understand it. The British 
constitution is comprehensible to property lawyers and legal historians, but not to 
present-day constitutional lawyers, be they from the USA, Canada or Continental 
Europe – an aspect where European and American lawyers see entirely eye to eye. 
What is called the constitution in Britain is a feudal constitution of an Ancien Régime, 
that is, prior to the US American (1787) and French (1791) constitutions at the onset 
of the French revolution from 1789 onwards, which were, together with the short-
lived Polish constitution of the 3rd May 1791,33 the first constitutions in a modern 
sense. Normally, the term ‘Ancien Régime’ is not used in British political and legal 
history. Unlike on the Continent, the English/British system was never swept away by 
a revolution, or at least modelled into a formal constitutional monarchy as in many 
European states in the nineteenth century. Because of the absence of a constitutional 
rupture in England or Britain since 1689 and 1707, respectively, the word ‘ancien’ 
makes no sense, except from a continental European viewpoint.  
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It is a matter of common knowledge that in law all land in England and Wales 
belongs to the Crown and anyone who is inaccurately called an ‘owner’ of a plot of 
land is a tenant of the Crown, so that the old medieval feudal pyramid is technically 
still in place. While one normally is a tenant in chief who holds directly from the 
Crown, the mesne lords (intermediary vassals) have never been formally abolished 
and could theoretically appear in concrete conveyancing transactions, although that is 
rare today.34 The feudal system was weakened early by the Statute Quia Emptores of 
1290 which effectively allowed alienation of land by prohibiting subinfeudation and 
ordering the substitution of vassals (tenants) instead: the seller was substituted by the 
buyer. This is still the ultimate basis for every freehold conveyance in England and 
Wales today (ref. 34, p. 29).35 Scotland never had a law comparable to the Statute 
Quia Emptores, and sales of land were technically realised by subinfeudation, 
whereby the seller became the superior for his buyer as vassal (feuar),36 although 
from the eighteenth century onwards37 these concepts were effectively hollowed out 
(Ref. 36, pp. 4-5, Ref. 37, p. 57).38 In Scotland feudal tenure was formally abolished 
and converted to outright ownership in 2004. 39  One can see this situation as a 
historical leftover and a nice eccentricity, and usually it is reflected in conveyancing 
practices only. However, one should remain aware of the fact that in the concept of an 
unwritten constitution the skeleton is still this feudal pyramid based on landholding 
and property which props up the structure of the ‘state’. The great legal historian 
Frederic Maitland said for a good reason that ‘our whole constitutional law seems at 
times to be but an appendix to the law of real property.’40 When these times are 
depends significantly on the political style and attitude of the government of the day; 
there are no boundaries a written constitution would provide. 
‘Property’ or ‘real property’ should not be interpreted here from a narrow 
private law viewpoint of possession and use of land. Not only are a number of UK 
institutions of public law still rooted in feudalism, also the concept of sovereignty, 
especially as it is understood in the UK, derives ultimately from a (feudal) property 
concept. The Crown itself is the most obvious feudal constitutional institution. But 
there is also the question of crown land which is held by the monarch in different 
capacities: in a political capacity41 (e.g. Windsor castle held by the monarch as body 
politic) or in a private capacity (e.g. Balmoral), and the separation of these two 
categories can be difficult (Ref. 35, pp. 113, 115). Here a characteristic of feudalism 
becomes apparent: a blurred boundary between state and private ownership of the 
monarch, between public and private property, and, finally, between sovereignty and 
property which seventeenth century legal scholars so carefully sought to separate 
from one another.42 The feudal institution of the Duchy of Lancaster finances the 
monarch’s private expenditure as a sovereign, while the Duchy of Cornwall provides 
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an income for the Prince of Wales as heir apparent and Duke of Cornwall (Ref. 35, 
pp. 118, 119). 43  The statute abolishing the feudal system in Scotland expressly 
excepted the monarch’s powers by virtue of the royal prerogative, 44  so that the 
specifically proprietary element of feudalism is repealed, while the constitutional 
element is preserved. The historical basis of the House of Lords and Parliament as a 
whole is still a medieval royal and feudal one45 – it could not be otherwise, for there is 
no constitutional law that could have created it, unlike the Scottish Parliament, for 
example.46 
While the Scottish Parliament is created by an Act of the British Parliament,47 
the power of the British Parliament to do so emanates from its parliamentary 
sovereignty, again a feudal concept, though rather in form of a reinterpretation of a 
remaining institution of the dying classical feudalism in the sixteenth century. The 
creator of the modern concept of sovereignty, Jean Bodin, was much influenced by 
the Roman law concept of dominium or property ownership when he developed the 
idea of sovereignty (Ref. 42, pp. 73-74).48 Thomas Hobbes also saw the concept of 
property as the predecessor, and as a maker, of sovereignty. 49 It is a specifically 
Anglo-Saxon characteristic that property has been considered as having a central role 
in the definition of sovereignty, and, since Locke in particular, of liberty,50 which 
introduced the possibility that sovereign powers could gradually shift from a monarch 
or a college of aristocrats to the people. Continental European thinkers were not 
prepared to follow that conception entirely. Rousseau would postulate the people as 
the sovereign, but property had no constitution-building role for him, rather the 
opposite:51 property was a source of alienation52 – an idea that inspired Hegel53 and 
Marx whose profoundly influential alienation theory 54  took Hegel’s alienation 
concept into the social and economic sphere.  
It is the British Parliament, not the British people which has sovereignty (Ref. 
1, p. 109).55 There is no constitutional rule that stipulates the people as the sovereign 
(something that many modern constitutions would often state at the beginning)56 
which delegates its sovereignty to its parliament by electing it. The opponent of 
parliamentary sovereignty is the royal prerogative, anachronistic and unacceptable in 
a modern constitutional system, but alive and well in the British one, although 
increasingly repressed by Parliament over the centuries.57 Parliamentary sovereignty 
cannot be bound by statutes and other legal acts.58 For example, it was a choice of 
Parliament (Ref. 58, p. 39).59 (or the government majority in Parliament) to consider 
itself bound by an advisory60 referendum in 2016 which recommended Britain’s exit 
from the European Union; and the succeeding Parliament after the elections in June 
2017 also seems to honour the outcome of this referendum, although the traditional 
understanding of parliamentary sovereignty means that a new Parliament need not 
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feel, and cannot be, bound by a previous Parliament, according to the classical British 
definition of parliamentary sovereignty by Dicey (Ref. 58, pp. 39-40, 69-70). 
 
 
b) Changing constitutional reality behind unmodified positive law 
Legal institutions, whether of public law (e.g. Parliament and constitutional rules) or 
of private law (e.g. property and ownership) may change their social, economic or 
political functions behind a framework of positive law without necessitating the 
change of the positive law itself.61  A constitutional system that largely relies on 
unwritten customary law and has never formally discarded feudalism but has 
reinterpreted and subverted it to accommodate capitalism while paying lip service to 
old formal structures, is a particularly good example of such a process. An 
international commercial lawyer will notice that there is a trend towards modern 
feudal structures through the increase of property protection treaties (like TRIPs for 
intellectual property), or through global investment (i.e. property or assets) protection 
by free trade agreements, sometimes combined with Investor-State Dispute 
Settlements (as in CETA) as private judicature outside the ordinary courts that are a 
central manifestation of state sovereignty (Ref. 42, pp. 59-60, 62). Furthermore, large 
and multinational private corporations, thus private property holding entities, are 
increasingly entrusted with responsibilities that were historically acts and powers of 
state sovereignty, such as the outsourcing of warfare by the USA or the foundation of 
the EU financial stability mechanism on a private company with unlimited immunity 
of its organs, and outside actual EU law (Ref. 42, pp. 64, 69-70). Private entities 
based on private property fulfil public obligations, but without the accountability and 
checks and balances a modern constitutional system would provide. It seems that 
corporate social responsibility measures seek to replicate the constitutional 
accountability in a democratic and parliamentary system. But that is impossible unless 
one discards the principles of a company as having separate legal personality, 62 
limited liability of shareholders63 and therefore separation of ownership from power 
and control, but also from responsibility.64 It also appears to be that the British feudal 
constitutional framework from the ‘Ancien Régime’ could adapt to such post-
democratic phenomena more easily than modern constitutional systems.65 After the 
detour via a liberal democracy, it could be a modernised homecoming to a kind of 
neo-feudalism with emphasis on the proprietary element of beneficium in the feudal 
relationship,66 much in a Brexit-spirit of reverting to ancient British tradition.    
British pragmatism, as well as the difficulty to invade the British isles and 
colonise them in the wake of such military intervention with more recent political 
ideas (as happened in Germany and Italy as a consequence of the Napoleonic wars), 
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may have helped preserving the British feudal constitutional framework. And 
something else was also crucial for its continued existence: its opaqueness and 
flexibility. One can read into the British system what one wants to and interpret it in a 
great number of ways without the need for a change of the legal status quo. Thus the 
system can be invoked for feudal absolutism as in the 17th century (where it originated 
from), or for a paternalistic conservative welfare state; it can be reconciled with a 
liberal and perhaps democratic laisser faire society, and it could also be customised to 
modern authoritarian forms of government. As long as the position of the crown and 
the feudal structure are not touched (the modern social adaptation is particularly the 
class system which defines itself considerably through property ownership), much 
greater political and social flexibility and scope for new design is possible than under 
a legal system with a written constitution.  
It is telling that Britain is still never referred to as the ‘British state’ in 
common parlance (Ref. 45, p. 195),67 thus, in law, as a creature of a written (modern) 
constitution,68 but as the ‘Crown’, ‘Parliament’ or the ‘Government’. In this way, the 
late medieval-feudal notion of the king (who was at that time not ‘sovereign’ in the 
sense of the 17th century69) and/or of a college of physical people, as the embodiment 
of a state, lives on, in the sense of a dominium regale et politicum, consisting of the 
composite body politic of king and Parliament, to whom together as ‘king in 
parliament’ a notion of ‘sovereignty’ was ascribed (on this point and on the legal 
fiction of the king’s two bodies, see Ref. 43, pp. 2-5, 20, 225-227, 302, 314, 401). It 
becomes apparent that, in law (sociologists and political scientists may differ) the 
state, such as the US-American state or the French state, are the creatures of, and 
based on, their constitutions, and in these countries the state is very much present in 
everyday life, unlike in Britain. One can interpret this British phenomenon variously 
as a feature of the lingering medieval state in which only the parochial landlords or 
lords of the manor (ref. 35, p. 108)70 and their jurisdiction were perceived by the local 
population, or as a sign of an authoritarian state in essence which has no particular 
welfarist ambitions and so does not encroach on people’s lives except correctively by 
punishment, or as a liberal state which is supposed to interfere as little as possible in 
human lives and in the economy. The ambiguous opacity of the British constitutional 
system permits such varieties of interpretation.  
One can adapt the readings of the British constitution to modern society, or 
choose not to, or, most commonly, do both selectively. A good example of a ‘modern’ 
interpretation is the following statement from 1999 about the royal prerogative, this 
ancient residue in the constitutional system that became very relevant for Brexit:71 
 
‘It might be assumed that the world orders of Jacobean England and the United Kingdom 
entering the twenty-first century are totally different. Divine right is not invoked to justify the 
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powers of the Crown and yet most of the powers of the Crown still exist to be exercised by the 
Crown as it sees fit. … 
We may find it difficult to establish what the royal prerogative meant in the past: we have 
to interpret the powers of the prerogative within the context of the political arrangements of 
the day. We know that the royal prerogative exists today, but how far do the old authorities 
from a bygone era serve as a useful guide to the present day powers of the Crown?’ 
 
However, there is no compelling constitutional reason to assume that this view has to 
be adopted again, in 2017,72 particularly by the present government that wants to 
restore British (more precisely: English) values and traditions from perhaps the 1950s, 
or from Victorian times or even earlier – the recreation of a romanticised traditional 
Britain of the past is necessarily a pastiche of inconsistencies and anachronisms. But 
the royal prerogative is certainly a part of British constitutional tradition and fits well 
if one wants it to fit, and the ‘context of the political arrangements of the day’ 
undoubtedly permits a widening of the scope of the prerogative of the Crown. 
Recently, the prime minister took the view that notification under article 50 of 
the Treaty of the European Union to start withdrawal from the EU is fully within the 
powers of government by virtue of the Crown’s prerogative powers to enter into and 
withdraw from treaties, so that Parliament need not be involved.73 This opinion could 
only have puzzled European constitutional lawyers not familiar with the feudal root of 
the British constitutional system. Some, not all, 74  British constitutional lawyers 
considered the government’s position as legally acceptable, but found it politically 
unwise.75 In R. (Miller) v. S. of State for Exiting the European Union the Supreme 
Court confirmed that the royal prerogative is residual and can be curtailed or 
abrogated by Parliamentary legislation. The European Communities Act 1972, having 
constitutional character, is a partial transfer of law-making powers by Parliament to 
EU legislature and requires that domestic law has to be consistent with EU law. A 
withdrawal from the EU constitutes a significant constitutional change, because the 
EU Treaties are a source of domestic law and legal rights; they do not only concern 
the international relations of the UK. Thus the royal prerogative to make and unmake 
treaties does not apply to the EU Treaties, so that ministers do not have the power to 
withdraw on the basis of the royal prerogative. An express power of withdrawal 
would have to have been created by the 1972 Act, but such a power does not exist. 
Therefore, the Supreme Court held, ministers require Parliament as the authority of 
primary legislation for giving notice under Art. 50.76 
The Supreme Court, however, remarked that, although the prerogative powers 
have been described as a ‘relic of a past age’, ‘that description should not be 
understood as implying that the royal prerogative is either anomalous or 
anachronistic’.77 From the viewpoint of a modern constitutional system it is probably 
both,78 and the fact that private persons with the necessary financial means had to 
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bring an action to trigger a ruling of fundamental constitutional importance on the 
competence of state institutions only intensifies this impression – in written 
constitutions one would find such competence rules. R. (Miller) certainly added to the 
UK constitution, but this decision could have done that in another way, as there are no 
restrictions except through statutes and precedents the Court felt bound by; there is no 
higher order of legal (constitutional) rules (Ref. 68, p. 239-240). In twenty years’ 
time, when another generation of lawyers may have grown up in a new spirit, 
decisions may be considerably different. The British constitutional system is very 
elastic.   
It is not a new phenomenon that the ambiguous and opaque British 
constitution allows flexible and even contradicting interpretations of its nature. 
Montesquieu famously used in the eleventh book of his De l’esprit des lois (1748) an 
idealised interpretation of the British constitution to explain and justify the principle 
of the separation of powers and of checks and balances which are a cornerstone of 
every modern constitution:79  
 
‘On the Constitution of England 
… 
When the legislative and executive power are united in the same person, or in the same body 
of magistracy, there can be then no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same 
monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner. 
Again, there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and 
executive powers. … 
It is not my business to examine whether the English actually enjoy this liberty, or not. 
Sufficient is for my purpose to observe, that it is established by their laws; and I inquire no 
further.’ 
  
The last comment indicates that Montesquieu was aware of constitutional realities. In 
fact, the British constitutional system has always had difficulties with the concept of 
the separation of powers;80 perhaps one could say that this notion became finally 
embodied in the British constitution with the establishment of a Supreme Court as an 
authority entirely separate from the House of Lords in 2009.81 
Sixty years after Montesquieu, another commentator understood the British 
constitution entirely differently. Adam Heinrich Müller, student of Gustav Hugo 
(founder of the German Historical School of Law), was a theorist of the state of the 
Romantic period, an opponent of the French revolution and an important 
representative of the conservative counter-Enlightenment. In 1809, he made the 
following observation about the British constitution in his Elements of Statecraft 
(Elemente der Staatskunst):82 
 
‘What Montesquieu attaches such great importance to, the mechanical separation of powers, 
the artificial limitation of sovereignty for the purpose of liberty, is, according to our 
experience, entirely impractical, a curiosity and antique. And this political quackery comes 
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much closer to Theophrastus Paracelsus’s experiments to create humans in his chemical 
alembics and flasks than one may think. It is not true that in England such a separation of 
powers takes place: only bookish scholars and later the populace, following in their footsteps, 
have read this fatuous thought into the British constitution. Power is not separated; rather, the 
ancient opposites in civil society and their interdependencies, out of which all true and simple 
power then arises, are preserved in England, hallowed and affirmed by the time and by 
faithful persistence (Beharren) of the nation: that means ‘British constitution’, and that only 
deserves to be called constitution in every place and in all countries of the world.’ 
 
Müller may be a counter-Enlightenment figure, closer to Burke or perhaps de 
Maistre83 than to Montesquieu or Rousseau, but his reference to Paracelsus’s alchemy 
reveals that he was also a child of the Enlightenment, because it was only in the 
eighteenth century that alchemy became discredited as obscurantist charlatanism; in 
the seventeenth century even Robert Boyle and Isaac Newton were keen alchemists.84 
In any case, one could argue that parts of Müller’s analysis are still valid. It also 
shows that what is called ‘British constitution’ is a malleable notion that is created by 
the beholder in the spirit of the time and, if the beholder is a politician, in accordance 
with his or her political ambitions, more than a written constitution would tolerate. 
It is therefore obvious that democracy is as little enshrined in the British 
constitutional system as anything else. 85  The political and constitutional 
circumstances surrounding Brexit show that one is mistaken if one thinks that the 
present remnants of the feudal structure are only an amiable irrelevance, a charming 
distinguishing feature of Britain when compared to the European Continent, 
idiosyncratic and playing to the clichéd view Europeans have about the British as an 
eccentric people clinging to their bizarre traditions.86 Idiosyncratic all that may be, 
charming it is certainly not. Apart from the fact that only those members of the class 
regarded as born to rule can allow themselves to indulge in eccentricities (a point 
Europeans frequently fail to realise), these eccentricities can usher in outright 
authoritarian and non-democratic measures which are perfectly compatible with the 
British constitutional system, since almost everything is compatible with this system, 
except, perhaps, radical forms of socialism. 
It is a strange paradox that the EU, which effectively limited British 
parliamentary sovereignty,87 acted as a kind of framework, or others would say, as a 
corset, that helped the ancient British constitutional system emulating a modern 
democratic state and ensured that the British constitution is continued to be 
interpreted in the light of a modern liberal and pluralist parliamentary democracy. 
This is puzzling in two ways: First, it is not a constitution that enacts – from a 
lawyer’s perspective – the legal structures of a democratic system, but it is rather 
political consensus from time to time that moulds the British constitutional system 
from the ‘Ancien Régime’ into a modern democracy. Secondly, the EU itself has a 
number of democratic deficits88 and is not an impeccable role model for democracies. 
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Furthermore, governments in other European Member States, such as in Poland, seek 
to erode the rule of law in their country,89 while maintaining EU membership. Here 
one may remember that the governing Law and Justice party in Poland and the 
governing Tory party in Britain formed together with other right-wing parties a 
separate club in the European Parliament in 2009,90 which underlines their mutual 
political sympathies. The fact that the UK was a democracy when it joined the EU 
does not mean that it will remain a modern highly developed democracy after it has 
left it. In the absence of a formal constitution the common law is not an adequate 
safeguard either. 
 
 
c) The common law as the ultimate source of law 
In Britain the ultimate source of law, including for the courts, is not a constitution, but 
a mystical idea of the ‘common law’. This also applies to the courts deciding on 
constitutional matters, such as on the royal prerogative, although the source of the 
royal prerogative itself is not the common law (Ref. 71, p. 78). According to legal 
tradition the first source of law are Acts of Parliament, followed by decided cases (the 
common law in the regular sense); the decided cases are subordinate to Acts of 
Parliament, if any (Ref. 58, p. 62).91  However, since historically at least Acts of 
Parliament have been considered as remedial (which is also reflected in the – inexact 
– canon of statutory interpretation, Ref. 91, pp. 11, 79-85, 157) and not as 
comprehensive, unlike in a codified system,92 courts not only apply, but also align, 
extend and interpretatively rework the statute in question, so that the common law is 
necessarily a major part of living statutory law. Acts of Parliament flow from 
parliamentary sovereignty, but where parliamentary sovereignty emanates from is 
unclear: it is again the courts in their decisions which find, or ascertain, the extent of 
that sovereignty,93 for example where there is a conflict with the royal prerogative. So 
we are back to a constitutional and general customary law, the ‘common law’ as the 
mystical source of all law. And this ‘common law’ as an ideal seems to have a special 
fascination for many, like the conservative philosopher Roger Scruton:94   
 
‘I was absolutely bowled over by the English law. I had no idea of its historical depth and the 
fact that it captured in beautiful concepts a vision of what it is to be at home for a thousand 
years in a single place which is what our country has experienced. And the common law is a 
wonderful expression of this because it is a law which has never been imposed from above, it 
has grown from the decisions of the courts, grown from concrete cases in which real human 
conflicts of all kinds have been resolved by impartial judges … without there necessarily 
being a statute … And this way of reasoning from the particular case to the principle, rather 
than from the abstract structure of the constitution down to the particular case, is, in my view, 
not just intellectually, but also morally, completely superior to the other way of doing it. … 
And it’s at the root of a deep … structural antagonism between Common law countries and 
these Roman law countries, Civilian, as they are called, such as the French and the German.’ 
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This romantic view is at odds with the history of English law, but rather common and 
representative, also among English lawyers. The statement stresses at least three 
points:  
First, English law is supposedly the law for self-proclaimed English people, 
not for people having arrived from elsewhere during the centuries, such as non-white 
people, but also Europeans. Apparently, English law is not compatible with Scots law 
either which has a Civilian origin to some extent, so that Scottish people and English 
law would be a problematic match, too. Behind this statement stands the feudal idea 
that an individual’s personal status determines the law that applies to him, such as 
different marriage laws or laws of succession for the nobility, the common people, 
foreigners, Jews and so forth, as was the case well into the nineteenth century in 
Europe. However, despite that historical reality, some comparative lawyers conjure up 
the idea of a more or less uniform concept of a Roman law-based ius commune 
Europaeum that apparently existed in Europe in the sixteenth century already. In this 
way they try to justifiy attempts at a Europe-wide unification of private law today,95 
an endeavour that initiates the ‘Herderian paradox’ explained above. Several 
specialists in German legal history have shown that the approach of these ‘ius 
commune seekers’ is historically incorrect because there was rather a patchwork of 
different laws applying simultaneously according to class and status, feudal tenure, 
origin, religion, territory and so forth.96 One may be reminded that the Austrian Civil 
Code, promulgated in 1811 and still in force with many amendments, is entitled 
‘General Civil Code’ (Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch), 97  and ‘general’ 
emphasised the then new fact98 that the civil code was supposed to apply to all classes 
of society.99 So in theory one could bring a civil law action for damages even against 
the Emperor, although that most likely never happened.  
The idea of English law for the English (British) and some other law for the 
others was reflected in the usual situation in much of the British Empire. For instance, 
in India under British colonial rule that was often the legal reality, in form of a 
divergent application of the law (usually imported English law) to the British and to 
the Indians.100 In Africa under British colonial rule the British authorities frequently 
used and shaped local customary laws for, and supposedly from, the indigenous 
population. These laws were exploited in the context of the ‘indirect rule’ to serve the 
interests of the colonial powers, while the British were subjected to their own law.101 
The existing constitutional framework does not expressly stand against a special 
regime in a post-Brexit Britain for the Scots, Welsh and Irish or any other group one 
may seek to define. 
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Secondly, Scruton considers English law as intellectually and morally superior 
to Civilian legal systems, which seeks to separate Britain clearly from European 
influence, also in relation to legal and constitutional theories. And thirdly, his 
statement emphasises that a modern constitution as an ‘abstract structure’ (and as the 
ultimate source of law) is irreconcilable with the common law. 
Indeed, there is not much appetite to enact a British written constitution (Ref. 
1, p. 230, Ref. 55, p. 541), and although Brexit may highlight shortcomings of the 
present constitutional system, the forces that brought about Brexit are also forces 
which have little time for ‘French’ or continental European abstractions with which 
modern constitutions are associated. This makes a modern written British constitution 
even less likely, apart from the big problem of political consensus about its content. 
Theoretically it is not too difficult to draft a constitution: it is more a question of legal 
craftsmanship than ingenuity, similar to a trained composer being asked to write a 
fugue. But in Britain there is presumably not the necessary know-how for creating a 
modern constitution. There is even little research and teaching of comparative 
constitutional law, which also explains the usually limited understanding of the next 
theme, federalism. 
 
 
3 Federalism and the Position of Scotland in Post-Brexit Britain 
 
a) The unacknowledged federalism in the UK 
Scotland is placed in the UK in form of an unrecognised limping federalism, or 
asymmetrical devolution as it is usually called (Ref. 1, p. 93),102 under the Scotland 
Act 1998 which contains, in particular, the establishment of the Scottish Parliament 
and its legislative competence in relation to the British Parliament and government.103 
The term ‘federalism’ is unpopular in the UK,104 not only because it may remind too 
much of the ‘enemy’ in culture, the USA, and the former enemy in war, Germany, but 
also because a true federal system is incompatible with the British feudal 
constitutional framework outlined before: a federal system would not allow the 
concept of overriding parliamentary sovereignty of the central parliament but would 
require central and state parliaments being subordinate to the federal constitution 
(Ref. 1, p. 112). A federal system requires being laid down in a written constitution in 
the modern sense, partly because of the technicalities of competences of state and 
federal authorities, between reserved and devolved matters,105 and partly because of 
the fact that federalism plays a role in providing checks and balances that underlines 
the constitutional framework of the whole state, not only the region in question. The 
British form of ‘limping’ federalism established a Scottish Parliament, but no English 
 16 
Parliament, since England is not a federal entity. This leads to interesting 
constitutional entanglements, for instance, when the British Parliament (with Scottish 
MPs) has to act as the English Parliament in effect (Ref. 1, pp. 98-99: ‘West Lothian 
Question’). Often it has been said that an English federal state would not make sense, 
since it is infinitely bigger than Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland (Ref. 1, pp. 93, 
99-100), and indeed, a consequent federalism would probably have to divide England 
into four regions or so (London being one of them) with state parliaments in each 
region106 – a purely academic suggestion.  
What is not appreciated satisfactorily, also among British constitutional 
scholars, is the fact that an ultimately feudal constitutional system that is still the 
design and framework of the state can only be a system of centralism.107  Where 
historically the princes and later the regions had too much power which went towards 
independent sovereignty, then the state fell apart, as in Germany, finally after the 
Peace of Westphalia in 1648;108 where this regional power was curbed, the state 
preserved itself as a centralised entity, as in France under Louis XIII and Louis 
XIV.109 Thus Britain could afford the luxury to establish this partial and incomplete 
system of federalism for Scotland because it has been a member of the EU where the 
position of being a sovereign nation state is less relevant: a Member State is 
embedded in a supranational legal and political framework. Once Britain is on its own 
after Brexit, the assertion of its national unity and integrity will become much more 
significant, and the present devolution arrangement under the Scotland Act may well 
suffer. There are already some indications in this respect. The British Government 
considers powers that will revert from the EU after Brexit as powers exclusively 
reserved to the UK Parliament, not as powers that could (partly) go to the devolved 
Scottish Parliament.110 In R. (Miller) v. S. of State for Exiting the European Union the 
Supreme Court decided that the Scottish Parliament (and the Welsh and Northern 
Ireland Assemblies) do not have a legal veto on the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.111 
The Government’s and the Supreme Court’s positions are entirely in line with British 
constitutional law. 
Unpopular as this may be with some Scots, the Scotland Act that introduced 
devolution is the product of parliamentary sovereignty from the British Parliament in 
Westminster, and this Act, as well as the Scottish Parliament through it, are sustained 
by this parliamentary sovereignty and based on an Act of the British Parliament (Ref. 
1, p. 112, Ref. 105, p. 428, Ref. 102, p. 218).112 According to the orthodox theory of 
parliamentary sovereignty there is no higher rank of statutes, hence future parliaments 
cannot be bound by this Act.113  They may choose to abolish it instead (and the 
Scottish MP will always be in the minority in Westminster). The recently introduced 
s. 63A of the Scotland Act 1998 stands against this interpretation,114 and in R. (Miller) 
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the Supreme Court affirmed the British Parliament’s self-limitation of its 
parliamentary sovereignty in s. 63A.115 But this legal construct is effectively the same 
that reconciled the UK parliamentary sovereignty with EU membership of the UK,116 
and such an argument presumably carries much less weight with a British government 
(or Parliament) that prepares for Brexit. 
 
 
b) Constitutional Solutions: Federalism – Centralism – Independence  
The cleanest solution after Brexit would be a written federal constitution as the 
ultimate source of law which creates and empowers a national parliament and 
regional parliaments separately and determines their legislative competencies, with a 
recourse to a (separate) constitutional court in cases of conflicts of competence. In 
this way the Scottish Parliament and Government would be established by, and based 
on, the constitution, not on the parliamentary sovereignty of the British Parliament. 
Where the authority to enact such a constitution shall come from, is an interesting 
point, but goes beyond this discussion (Ref. 1, p. 229).117 
However, the clean solution of establishing a federal state of the UK with a 
written constitution is the most unlikely option in the present political situation. 
Another possibility is Scotland blending into British centralism as a North British 
region – not an entirely unacceptable approach because it avoids possible political 
turmoil and civil unrest as well as fast economic decline in the region. The most 
realistic scenario is muddling along with the present constitutional arrangement post-
Brexit as long as possible, but the situation is unlikely to be entirely stable for very 
long and may not survive into the next generation.  
The most ambitious solution is Scottish independence. For this option, 
however, the Scottish independence referendum of 2014 has shown that the way in 
which the ruling Scottish National Party (SNP) approaches the matter of 
independence is perhaps the safest route to absolute failure. Those who lived through 
the campaign for Scottish independence before the referendum on 18 September 2014 
will remember that the SNP as campaign leader had only foggy ideas about the 
constitutional basis of the new Scottish state they aimed at. The White Book the 
Scottish government issued as ‘a guide to an independent Scotland’118 had very little 
to say about a Scottish constitution after independence beyond broad ideas about 
enactment and content, such as ‘[t]he process by which Scotland adopts a written 
constitution is as important as its content.’119 It was not more than an initial discussion 
paper; nothing was suitable for enactment and enforcement in case of independence. 
The most obvious reason for the reticence of the SNP government in relation 
to a Scottish constitution is that, again, there does not seem to be sufficient 
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appreciation for the concept of a constitution in a modern sense: Scots were also 
socialised under the traditional feudal British constitution that can, and currently does, 
assume democratic forms. But, as said, it cannot cope with, and is not associated with, 
modern federal structures.120 So the idea of preparing and passing a regional state 
constitution for Scotland in any event, irrespective of whether and when 
independence will follow at a later date has apparently not crossed the minds of 
Scottish politicians. In fact, in federal states like Germany or Austria their states or 
Länder obviously have separate state constitutions. However, state law must not 
contradict the national laws or the constitution of the federation (Bund). 121  For 
Scotland the enactment of a Scottish constitution can be more challenging because it 
is more difficult to ascertain if and when the Scottish constitution conflicts with the 
unwritten British constitution. It is also hard to establish a competence to pass such a 
constitution, because under the Scotland Act 1998 constitutional issues are a reserved 
matter.122 
Nevertheless, it would be advisable to explore ways to enact a regional 
constitution in Scotland which could serve, at least in the interim, as a national 
constitution in the case of later independence. Some existing constitutional examples, 
and even some solutions in history could provide some inspiration, such as the 
Compromise (Ausgleich) between Austria and Hungary. That Compromise created a 
real union (not a federation123) between Austria and Hungary and established the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1867.124 Whether or not there will be a further Scottish 
independence referendum – which may also be advisory as the Brexit referendum and 
the independence referendum of 2014 were125 – there could be a constitutional crisis, 
especially if a referendum held were to result in favour of independence. This would 
not be a good time to cobble together a constitutional framework for a possible new 
state, and the general lack of expertise in drafting matters would only exacerbate that 
situation. Furthermore, a referendum question, such as, ‘Should Scotland be an 
independent country?’, 126  only makes sense to a lawyer if there is a (draft) 
constitution in place which would create this independent country, otherwise 
‘Scotland’ remains an irrational romantic notion. 
In cases of state secession, constitutional crises and even the breach of the 
national constitution are the norm, unless an existing constitution has a procedure for 
the secession of a region.127 Such rules do not exist under the British constitution. For 
example, the Declaration of Independence of the USA in 1776 did not comply with 
British constitutional law – still a valid argument, given the constitutional continuity 
of Britain since 1707 and of England since 1689. Something comparable to the 
civilised ‘Edinburgh Agreement’ (Ref. 55, p. 544)128 between the British and Scottish 
governments in 2012 to resolve the question of competence of the Scottish Parliament 
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in relation to the referendum is less likely to come about in the future, also because 
there is a much higher chance of success of a further independence referendum than 
was envisaged back in 2012 when the matter was clearly underestimated. So a crisis 
similar to that presently in Catalonia129 is a possibility.  
A disquieting point in the absence of any constitutional debate in the Scottish 
referendum in 2014 was the fact that in a new Scottish state the SNP government may 
have tried to rule on the basis of the royal prerogative for a time, since the Crown was 
supposed to be retained,130 and the royal prerogative is obviously not dependent on a 
constitutional framework. This government power would theoretically have been 
unfettered, because the safeguards (court decisions etc.) of the old British 
constitutional systems restricting this prerogative powers would presumably no longer 
have applied. Leaving aside the question of whether a new state in the twenty-first 
century should start as a monarchy, initially even without a constitution, there is also 
the puzzling problem what would have happened to the other political parties in the 
Scottish Parliament who were, and still are, opposed to independence. An SNP one-
party state is clearly not an option.  
There were other awkward features of the 2014 independence referendum. 
The SNP maintained that a separation of Scotland from the rest-UK would lead to a 
kind of continuation of Scotland’s membership in the EU because Scotland is already 
a member of the EU,131 blatantly in contradiction with established principles of state 
secession in public international law.132 The EU also made unequivocally clear that 
Scotland as a new state would have to apply for EU membership,133 a position that 
remains the same today. Although the EU might, in the long run, water down the 
importance of states, it paradoxically relies entirely on states for establishing 
membership (in line with public international law), and the recent experience with 
Catalonia underlines that. 134  For an independent Scotland, however, the political 
circumstances for joining the EU after Brexit might be more favourable than in 2014. 
The economic problems as a result of leaving the EU are for others to discuss. 
Nevertheless, both Scotland and England seeking to substitute the abandoned EU 
relationship with free trade agreements worldwide will not only have the difficulty of 
numerous lengthy and protracted trade negotiations. They will also have to deal with 
the fact that they will be associated with the British Empire, and their possible future 
trading partners will not have forgotten their sufferings under British colonial rule, 
particularly India (Ref. 100, pp. 238-265, 281-286, 331-357, 432-441), the seemingly 
most interesting trade candidate at the moment. It is mainly the region of what is 
today the European Union which Britain has not affronted, at least not after the 
Congress of Vienna of 1815. 
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In the independence campaign the SNP government also suggested a currency 
union with England (‘the sterling zone’) after Scottish independence135 which would 
have had the curious effect that an independent state would have had its central bank 
in exactly the state it wanted to leave. Therefore, England would necessarily have 
been in charge of Scotland’s banking sector and Scottish economic policies, but 
without Scottish MPs being represented in the Westminster Parliament who could 
exercise any influence (Ref. 132, p. 337). 
The Scottish separatists’ EU argument and the ‘sterling zone’ suggestion are 
both very reminiscent of the attempted ‘have the cake and eat it’ strategy of British 
Brexit supporters now:136 no EU membership but all financial and customs benefits of 
the single market. 
The Scottish independence campaign was also characterised by a divisive 
nationalistic them-and-us attitude, predominately directed against the English (for no 
acceptable reason), but it would only have been a question of time when Europeans 
and minorities would have been affected as well, especially if there had been 
independence. For example, in the Israeli press some Scottish Jews asked the question 
how ‘Scottish’ they would have to be in an independent Scotland. 137  The Brexit 
referendum and its aftermath echo this nationalistic and xenophobe divisiveness. One 
cannot help thinking that the confusion around Brexit today gives a good indication of 
the situation then if Scots had voted for independence in the referendum in 2014, 
which also suggests how level-headed and statesmanlike the Scottish government 
really was at the time. 
 
 
c) Relinquishing Scottish legal nationalism 
 
A final point concerns the future of Scots law, whatever the position of Scotland will 
be: a state in a further developed British constitutional federation or an independent 
country. In either case Scotland will retain its separate legal system, as preserved in 
the Act of Union in 1706.138 The rising Scottish legal nationalism from the 1960s 
onwards, mostly among Scottish legal academics, far less so among practitioners, 
wanted to safeguard Scots law against the perceived intrusions of English law and to 
determine a dissimilarity of Scots law as a partly Roman-law based mixed system 
between civil and common law in contrast to the unadulterated common law of 
England.139 This mission ought to be abandoned for several reasons. 
There are many flaws in the approach of Scottish legal nationalism, starting 
with the crude application of the concept of a mixed legal system and the problem that 
some areas of Scots private law are not really mixed because they are essentially 
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common law (contract, delict) or Roman law-based civil law (property). Furthermore, 
the nationalistic battle in academic gazettes does not really inform legal practice but 
may hamper the advancement of legal scholarship with its emphasis on obscure 
subjects only appreciated by a handful of specialists. One example from Scots 
commercial law is the claim by Scottish legal nationalists that the transfer of 
ownership under the Sale of Goods Act 1979, as an apparently ‘English’ common law 
statute,140 is causal.141 This purportedly imposes an alien conception on the old Scots 
common law under which the transfer of ownership is supposedly abstract, like under 
the German Civil Code (BGB), that is, detached from the validity of an underlying 
contract (e.g. sale) directed at passing ownership – in contrast to the causal transfer. 
Apart from the fact that the abstract conveyance in Scots common law is beyond 
doubt for immoveable property only,142 it was the successful lobbying of pragmatic 
Scottish merchants which brought the extension of the English Sale of Goods Act 
1893 (as it then was) to Scotland.143 Incidentally, the conveyance according to the 
Austrian General Civil Code or ABGB – clearly a civil law system – is also causal,144 
but many Scottish legal nationalists do not really arrive at a deep understanding of 
civil law systems.145 If there is any evident legacy of Scottish legal nationalism, then 
it is the segregation of non-Scottish legal scholars from their Scottish colleagues who 
are apparently the only ones with a true appreciation of Scots law.146 
The scientific value of the Scottish legal nationalist approach is doubtful, but I 
have discussed that elsewhere 147  and need not go into any detail here. This is 
increasingly a past debate anyway. If Scotland becomes independent, Scots law is just 
the law of a new state (if recognised by the international community) and the 
impassioned discourse about the separation from English law becomes redundant. If 
Scotland stays in the UK, any protectionist antiquarian hair-splitting by specialists, 
like the example of the abstract conveyance above, also ought to be discarded. 
Otherwise Scotland will not be able to establish itself as a small jurisdiction with laws 
which are recognised as a modern separate body of law in the UK and in the world. 
Scottish legal academics have a responsibility not to frustrate the development of 
Scots law with recherché themes as a battleground for out-dated nationalistic 
polemics couched in legal scholarship. 
 
 
4 Conclusion 
 
These discussions should not give the impression that a written constitution, either for 
Britain and Scotland, or for Scotland only, is a panacea. If there is no sufficient 
political will to perform and maintain a modern liberal democracy, one can easily 
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wreck a written constitution, irrespective of its technical-juristic quality. The Weimar 
constitution is an obvious example: it was never formally repealed by the Nazis, who 
saw no need to do so,148  which prompted Ernst Fraenkel to develop his famous 
analysis of the national-socialist state as a ‘dual state’ comprising the (liberal 
constitutional) ‘normative state’ and the ‘prerogative state’ (Maßnahmenstaat) of the 
national-socialist party.149 
Some of Fraenkel’s analysis may also be useful for the understanding of the 
British constitution and its anachronism of prerogative powers. Locke saw the 
prerogative powers as part of the executive (Ref. 50, pp. 373, 375, Ref. 58, p. 64), and 
the present British government does that as well. It was already Thomas Jefferson 
who regarded them as a separate force beside the executive and preferably proscribed 
(Ref. 149, p. 67). The Founders of the USA and the Framers of the US constitution 
experienced the British prerogative powers in Colonial America, and when devising 
the principles of constitutional control they may have had in mind persons like the 
current US president to curtail individual powers.150 Britain has no equivalent, except 
a modern benevolent interpretation of a malleable constitutional framework consisting 
of changeable customary law, some statutes and case law. The British constitutional 
system can be adapted easily to political developments that would now be considered 
as a retrograde step. In the EU Britain emulated modern democracies; whether it will 
do that outside the EU remains to be seen. 
Political theory and political history have shown in many examples that it is a 
fatal error to believe in the benevolence of the executive in a state. The ‘way of 
reasoning from the particular case to the principle, rather than from the abstract 
structure of the constitution down to the particular case’ is not ‘completely superior’ 
(Roger Scruton) but dangerous. At least for the purpose of the law, man is not good 
by nature, and a (written) constitution should restrict, control and correct with 
precision the powers of the political actors. The Brexit negotiations are not only about 
conflicts over EU citizens’ rights, the future economic relations and the financial 
settlement between the UK and the EU, but indirectly also about a divergence 
between a constitution and political players of an ancien régime in the UK and 
modern constitutional systems in the other EU Member States. Even the steady 
increase of the powers of the European Parliament 151  retraces, belatedly, the 
development of the constitutions and widening parliamentary powers against the ruler 
and the executive in continental European states over the last 200 years.  
Scotland, whether or not it stays in the UK, would benefit from giving itself a 
constitution, to ascertain what the legal framework of the country is and on which 
basis Scots law ultimately rests. This formal legalistic approach of a law-governed 
state (‘Rechtsstaat’), perhaps even beyond the principle of the rule of law,152 also has, 
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within limits, a Scottish precursor. The judge, jurist and philosopher Lord Kames 
(Henry Home, 1696-1782), a principal representative of the Scottish Enlightenment, 
said in 1745, well after Locke, but just before Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws and 
before Rousseau’s Second Discourse and Social Contract:153 
 
‘… no man is bound to obey the king’s commands, unless delivered in a certain form 
prescribed by law. … The laws are superior to the king, and these he must be judged by. And 
supposing an absolute government in the strictest sense, where the king’s will is law, yet there 
is always one law above him, which is that of self-preservation.’ 
 
If Scotland does choose to become independent, that should be a longer process, well-
organised also in relation to the Scottish economic position, pragmatic with a cross-
party consensus, and constitutional. Particularly perilous would be any emotional 
chauvinistic nationalism, whether outright or masked as ‘civic nationalism’. If 
Scotland managed its possible secession as a rational, legalistic progression where it 
establishes itself as a new state without nationalism at its inception, that would be a 
modern successful example of progress in the history of civilisation. 
 
_____________________ 
 
 
Acknowledgement 
This article is based on the Inaugural Lecture as Professor of Commercial Law at the 
University of Glasgow Law School, Scotland, United Kingdom, on 3 November 
2017. 
 
 
About the Author 
Andreas Rahmatian is Professor of Commercial Law at the University of Glasgow, 
Scotland, UK. Originally from Vienna, he obtained a degree and a PhD in law and a 
second degree in musicology and history there, and continued his studies with an 
LLM at the University of London. He qualified as a solicitor in London before he 
became an academic. His research interests comprise commercial law, intellectual 
property law, property law and property theory, legal history, intellectual history and 
the law. In 2014-15 he was a Fellow at the Institut d’Études Avancées, Nantes, 
France. His books include Copyright and Creativity: The Making of Property Rights 
in Creative Works (2011) and Lord Kames: Legal and Social Theorist (2015). 
 
 
References and Notes 
 24 
                                                 
1 V. Bogdanor (2009) The New British Constitution, (Oxford and Portland, OR: Hart 
Publishing), p. 173. 
2 A. de Tocqueville (1969) Democracy in America, (ed.) J. P. Mayer, New York: 
Doubleday, vol. 1, chapter 7, pp. 246, 254-255. For a historical discussion in relation 
to constitutions in Europe before 1848, see L. Lacche, Luigi (2013), Granted 
Constitutions. The Theory of Octroi and Constitutional Experiments in Europe in the 
Aftermath of the French Revolution, European Constitutional Law Review, 9(2), pp. 
285-314, at pp. 297-298. 
3  Scotland 62% remain, Northern Ireland 55.8% remain, England 46.6% remain, 
Wales 47.5% remain. See BBC EU referendum results, available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politics/eu_referendum/results (accessed 17 Jan 2018). 
4 R. (on the application of Miller) v The Secretary of State for Exiting the European 
Union [2016] EWHC 2768, para. 92.   
5  That was the headline of the Daily Mail on 4 November 2016, written by the 
political editor James Slack, online version: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
3903436/Enemies-people-Fury-touch-judges-defied-17-4m-Brexit-voters-trigger-
constitutional-crisis.html (accessed 17 Jan. 2018) after the High Court judgment of R. 
(on the application of Miller) v The Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union 
[2016] EWHC 2768 (Admin) was handed down. 
6 Compare, for example, the statement of the ‘Imperial Judicial Leader’ Hans Frank in 
Nazi Germany in 1936, that the judge’s duty is ‘not to give effect to a legal order 
above the people’s community (Volksgemeinschaft) or to enforce general ideas and 
values but to preserve the concrete folkish (völkische) communal order …’, extract in 
W. Hofer (1982) Der Nationalsozialismus. Dokumente 1933-1945 (Frankfurt am 
Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag), p. 101.  
7  Whether certain EU measures after the financial crisis, such as the Treaty on 
Stability, Coordination and Governance, TSCG (Fiscal Compact) (an 
intergovernmental treaty under international law between twenty-five EU Member 
States), further the principal European idea is debatable. 
8 The Bloomberg speech by the then Prime Minister David Cameron of 23 Jan. 2013, 
says that as well: ‘For us, the European Union is a means to an end – prosperity, 
stability, the anchor of freedom and democracy both within Europe and beyond her 
shores – not an end in itself.’, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/eu-speech-at-bloomberg (accessed 17 Jan. 
2018). 
9 A. Rahmatian (2016) European copyright inside or outside the European Union: 
pluralism of copyright laws and the “Herderian paradox”, International Review of 
Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 47(8), pp. 912-940, at pp. 919-921.  
10 J. G. Herder (1989) Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, (ed.) 
Martin Bollacher (Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag), pp. 253, 298, 
369-370. For Herder’s ‘Unity in difference’, see I. Berlin (2000) Herder and the 
Enlightenment, in: Isaiah Berlin, Henry Hardy (ed), Three Critics of the 
Enlightenment: Vico, Hamann, Herder (London: Pimlico), pp. 168–242, at p. 177.  
11 See e.g. the Prime Minister Theresa May in her keynote speech at the Conservative 
Party conference 2016: available at: 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/theresa-may-speech-tory-conference-
2016-in-full-transcript-a7346171.html (accessed 17 Jan. 2018): ‘But if you believe 
you’re a citizen of the world, you’re a citizen of nowhere. You don’t understand what 
the very word ‘citizenship’ means.’ Her statement was much more subdued at the 
 25 
                                                                                                                                           
Conservative Party Conference 2017: ‘If you are a citizen of the EU who has made 
their life in this country … we value the contribution you make to the life of our 
country. You are welcome here. And I urge the negotiating teams to reach agreement 
on this quickly because we want you to stay.’ (see 
https://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2017/10/theresa-mays-conservative-conference-speech-
full-text/ , accessed 17 Jan. 2018), but actually she leaves the result to the negotiators 
who can be blamed if an agreement cannot be reached. 
12 Maxine Frith, ‘I hope we ditch the Scots from the UK. And the Welsh. Then we can 
just be England. That’s what people want – England back’, The Sunday Herald, 26 
June 2016. 
13 European Council (Art. 50) meeting, 15 Dec. 2017, EUCO XT 20011/17, following 
Joint report from the negotiators of the European Union and the United Kingdom 
Government on progress during phase 1 of negotiations under Article 50 TEU on the 
United Kingdom’s orderly withdrawal from the European Union, 8 Dec. 2017. 
14  This is what I suggested in Andreas Rahmatian, ‘Brexit: Verhandeln um des 
Verhandelns Willen?’, Der Standard (Austria), 24 Aug. 2017. 
15 Statement by the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, 26 September 
2017, EU press release 533/17: ‘as I have always said, in fact Brexit is only about 
damage control’. 
16 As the former permanent representative of the UK to the EU, Sir Ivan Rogers, said 
in his resignation letter of 3 Jan. 2017: ‘Serious multilateral negotiating experience is 
in short supply in Whitehall, and that is not the case in the Commission or in the 
Council.’, available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-38503504 (accessed 
17 Jan. 2018). 
17 For the following passage see R. Arnold, L. A. F. Bently, E. Derclaye, G. B. 
Dinwoodie (2017) The Legal Consequences of Brexit Through the Lens of IP Law, 
University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 21/2017, Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2917219, p. 5. A. Rahmatian (2017) Brief 
speculations about changes to IP law in the UK after Brexit, Journal of Intellectual 
Property Law and Practice, 12(6), pp. 510-515, at pp. 512-513. 
18 For the history of this project, see J. Pila (2013) The European Patent: An old and 
vexing problem, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 62, pp. 917-940.  
19  Regulation 1257/2012 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the 
creation of unitary patent protection; Regulation 1260/2012 implementing enhanced 
cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection with regard to the 
applicable translation arrangements; Agreement on a Unified Patent Court (UPC 
Agreement) OJ C 175 (20/06/2013). 
20 Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 
June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (codification), OJ L 154. 
21 Council Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 of 12 December 2001 on Community Designs, 
OJ EC No L 3. 
22 See Regulation 1257/2012, Recitals 5 and 6, and Arts. 1 (2), 2 (b) and (c), 3 (1). 
23 UPC Agreement, Recital, paras. 3, 4 and 14.  
24 Regulation 1257/2012, Art. 3 (2). 
25 Regulation 1257/2012, Arts. 5 (3) and 7 (1): unitary patent and nature of patent 
protection granted are defined by national law.  
26 K. Kaesling (2013), The European patent with unitary effect – a unitary patent 
protection for a unitary market?, UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, 2(1), pp. 
87-111, at pp. 92, 110. 
 26 
                                                                                                                                           
27 Regulation 1257/2012, Recitals 3, 5. 
28 European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, s. 6. 
29 Regulation 1257/2012, Arts. 3 (2), and 7 (1). 
30 On 14 December 2016, the UK’s deputy permanent representative to the EU signed 
the Protocol on Privileges and Immunities of the Unified Patent Court, see Council of 
the EU website:  
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/agreements-
conventions/agreement/?aid=2016047 (accessed 17 Jan. 2018). 
31  Jennifer Rankin, Lisa O’Carroll, Jessica Elgot, ‘UK’s approach to Brexit is 
“nostalgic and unrealistic”, says EU negotiator’, The Guardian, 31 August 2017. 
32 Recently also R. (on the application of Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the 
European Union [2017] UKSC 5, [2017] HRLR 2, para. 40: ‘The United Kingdom 
does not have a constitution in the sense of a single coherent code of fundamental law 
which prevails over all other sources of law. Our constitutional arrangements have 
developed over time in a pragmatic as much as in a principled way, through a 
combination of statutes, events, conventions, academic writings and judicial 
decisions.’ 
33  N. Davies (1981) God’s Playground. A History of Poland, Vol. 1 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press), pp. 534-535). An English translation of the Polish Constitution of 3 
May 1791 under: 
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Constitution_of_May_3,_1791 (accessed 17 Jan. 
2018). The Polish constitution of 3rd May was still committed to the idea of estates 
and a state religion (arts. 1-4), but contained clearly the concept of separation of 
powers (arts. 5, 7-8). 
34 Ch. Harpum, S. Bridge, M. Dixon (Megarry and Wade) (2008) The Law of Real 
Property, 7th ed. (London: Thomson/Sweet and Maxwell), pp. 29-30. 
35 A. W. B. Simpson (1986) A History of the Land Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press), pp. 22, 54; J. Bray (2009) Feudal Law: The Case for Reform, in: Martin Dixon 
(ed.), Modern Studies in Property Law. Vol. 5 (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart 
Publishing), pp. 99-121, at p. 102. 
36 K. G. C. Reid (2003) The Abolition of Feudal Tenure in Scotland (London: Lexis-
Nexis), p. 2. 
37 Tenures Abolition Act 1746, Heritable Jurisdictions (Scotland) Act 1746. Gretton 
in K. G. C. Reid (and contributors) (1996) The Law of Property in Scotland 
(Edinburgh: Butterworth), pp. 56-57. 
38 Nonetheless, G. Gretton said in 1996 that only in one country feudalism survived in 
any real sense, and that was in Scotland. 
39 Abolition of Feudal Tenure etc. (Scotland) Act 2000, ss. 1, 2 (1). Reid, Ref. 36, p. 
8. 
40  F. W. Maitland (1909) The Constitutional History of England (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press), p. 538. 
41 And any sale of Crown land is subject to the prohibition of the Crown Lands Act 
1702, s. 5 (in England and Wales). In Scotland dealings with land by the Crown is 
allowed, Abolition of Feudal Tenure etc. (Scotland) Act 2000, s. 59.  
42 H. Grotius (2005) The Right of War and Peace (De Juri Belli ac Pacis), book 2, 
Richard Tuck (ed.) (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund), book 2, chapter 3, sections IV.1, pp. 
456-457. Modern legal doctrine still adheres to the strict separation between property 
and sovereignty, e.g. G. Jellinek (1960) Allgemeine Staatslehre, 3rd ed. (Bad 
Homburg: Hermann Gentner Verlag), pp. 398-399: power over a territory by a state is 
 27 
                                                                                                                                           
not dominium (property) but imperium (sovereignty). See also A. Rahmatian (2017) 
Indirect Sovereignty Through Property Rights, Notre Dame Journal of International 
and Comparative Law, 7(2), pp. 58-90 at p. 77.  
43 On the legal refinement of the doctrine of the king’s two bodies in relation to the 
Duchy of Lancaster, see E. Kantorowicz (1997) The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in 
Mediaeval Political Theology (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), pp. 403-
406. 
44 Abolition of Feudal Tenure etc. (Scotland) Act 2000, s. 58 (1), (2). 
45 M. Loughlin (2010) Foundations of Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 
pp. 246-247; A. F. Pollard (1926) The Evolution of Parliament, 2nd ed. (London: 
Longmans, Green and Co.), pp. 51-52, 62. For a short account, see Lord Longford (F. 
Pakenham) (1999) A History of the House of Lords (Stroud: Sutton), pp. 27-30, 35-39. 
46 Scotland Act 1998, s. 1(1). On the fact that the Scottish Parliament is sustained by, 
and dependent on, the parliamentary sovereignty of the British Parliament, see below 
under 3. 
47 Scotland Act 1998, s. 1 (1). 
48  J. Bodin (1955) Six Books of the Commonwealth, M. J. Tooley (tr. and ed.) 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell), book 1, chapter 8, pp. 25-27. 
49 T. Hobbes (2012) On the Citizen (De Cive), Richard Tuck and Michael Silverthorne 
(ed. and trans.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), chapter 6, section 15, p. 
85; T. Hobbes (2008) The Elements of Law Natural and Politic (Human Nature, De 
Corpore Politico), J. C. A. Gaskin (ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press), part II, 
‘De Corpore Politico’, chapter 24, sect. 2, p. 137. 
50  J. Locke (2013) Two Treatises of Government, 2nd ed., Peter Laslett (ed.) 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), ch. 7, § 87, ch. 8, § 119, pp. 323, 347. 
51  J.-J. Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (2011) The Discourses and other Early Political 
Writings, Victor Gourevitch (ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), Second 
Discourse, part II, pp. 161, 169. 
52  J.-J. Rousseau (1968) The Social Contract, Maurice Cranston (ed. and trans.) 
(London: Penguin Books), ch. I, 4, 9, pp. 54, 66. 
53  G. W. F. Hegel (1986) Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (Werke 7) 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag), § 41, § 46, § 65-68, § 73, pp. 102, 107-108, 
140-146, 156. 
54 K. Marx (2004) Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte (1844), in: I. Fetscher 
(ed.), Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Studienausgabe, vol. 2 (Berlin: Aufbau Verlag), 
pp. 77-90. 
55 See also N. Walker (2014) Our Constitutional Unsettlement, Public Law, pp. 529-
548, at pp. 530-536, discussing the weakening of absolute parliamentary sovereignty. 
Compare Hobbes, Ref. 49, chapter 9, section 10, p. 112. On the difference between 
sovereignty of the state (and parliamentary sovereignty is an application of that 
notion) and popular sovereignty, see H. Heller (1971) Souveränität, in: H. Heller, 
Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 2 (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff), pp. 31-202, at pp. 92-99. 
56 E.g. US Constitution, Preamble; German Basic Law (Grundgesetz), Preamble and 
Art. 20; French Constitution 1958, Art. 3; Austrian Constitution of 1920/1929, Art. 1. 
57 The Supreme Court’s narrative on this matter is in R. (on the application of Miller) 
v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, [2017] HRLR 
2, para. 41: ‘… over the centuries, those prerogative powers, collectively known as 
the Royal prerogative, were progressively reduced as Parliamentary democracy and 
the rule of law developed. By the end of the 20th century, the great majority of what 
 28 
                                                                                                                                           
had previously been prerogative powers, at least in relation to domestic matters, had 
become vested in the three principal organs of the state, the legislature (the two 
Houses of Parliament), the executive (ministers and the government more generally) 
and the judiciary (the judges).’ 
58 A. V. Dicey (1985) Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 10th ed. 
(Basingstoke and London: Macmillan), pp. 41-42. See also R. (on the application of 
Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, [2017] 
HRLR 2, para. 43, with reference to the classical definition by A. W. Dicey. 
59 More precisely ‘The Crown in Parliament’, as discussed by Dicey. 
60 The European Union Referendum Act 2015 is silent about the legal effect of the 
referendum.  
61  K. Renner (1949) The Institutions of Private Law and their Social Functions 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul), pp. 75-77, 252-254, 257, who developed this 
idea in relation to property, but this idea is also relevant to constitutional institutions. 
See also O. Kahn-Freund (1949) Introduction, and Notes, in K. Renner, The 
Institutions of Private Law and their Social Functions (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul), pp. 5, 96-97, 263. 
62 O. Kahn-Freund (1944) Some Reflections on Company Law Reform, Modern Law 
Review, 7, pp. 54-66, at pp. 55, 58-59, who criticizes the rule of separate legal 
personality because of its effects.  
63 P. Davies, and S. Worthington (2012) Principles of Modern Company Law (Gower 
& Davies), 9th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell), p. 207. 
64  A. A. Berle and G. C. Means (1933) The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property (New York: The Macmillan Company),  pp. 278-279, 281, 285. 
65  See, for example, the challenges of the EU fiscal stability measures as 
unconstitutional under the German constitution before the German Constitutional 
Court, discussion in Rahmatian, Ref. 42, p. 70, with further references. 
66 F. L. Ganshof (1964) Feudalism, 3rd ed., trans. Ph. Grierson (London: Longman), p. 
106: fief (beneficium) – as opposed to the personal element in feudalism, vassalage 
(homage and fealty). 
67 See also discussion by M. Loughlin (1999) The State, the Crown and the Law, in: 
Maurice Sunkin and Sebastian Payne (eds.), The Nature of the Crown: A Legal and 
Political Analysis (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 35. Modern British 
constitutional theory is obviously more advanced and sophisticated. 
68 H. Kelsen (1992) Reine Rechtslehre (Wien: Österreichische Staatsdruckerei), pp.  
283-284, 289. 
69 E.g. B. de Jouvenel (1993) On Power. The Natural History of Its Growth, trans. J. 
F. Huntington, orig. fr. Du Pouvoir. Histoire Naturelle de sa Croissance (Indianapolis: 
Liberty Fund), pp. 31-33. 
70 The manor denoted a jurisdictional or economic entity and played a role in feudal 
society although it was not part of the feudal pyramid.  
71 S. Payne (1999) The Royal Prerogative, in: M. Sunkin and S. Payne (eds.), The 
Nature of the Crown: A Legal and Political Analysis (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press), pp. 77-110, at pp. 77, 78. 
72 It has, however, been adopted by the UK Supreme Court in 2017, see R. (on the 
application of Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] 
UKSC 5, [2017] HRLR 2, paras. 41-43. 
73 R. (on the application of Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European 
Union [2017] UKSC 5, [2017] HRLR 2. The government’s position is set out in para. 
 29 
                                                                                                                                           
34. The matter became a constitutional formality, because the European Union 
(Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017 went through Parliament unopposed, saying in 
s. 1 that the Prime Minister may notify under Art. 50 (2) the UK’s intention to 
withdraw from the EU, which is the same result as initially sought by the government, 
but now only with agreement by Parliament. 
74  E.g. Barber, Hickman and King, Pulling the Article 50 ‘Trigger’: Parliament’s 
Indispensable Role, U.K. Const. L. Blog (27 Jun 2016) (available at 
https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/) (accessed 17 Jan. 2018).  
75 Prof. A. McHarg and Prof. A. Tomkins in Peter Nicholson, Brexit: a full menu, 
Journal of the Law Society of Scotland, 18 July 2016, pp. 12-15. 
76 R. (on the application of Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European 
Union [2017] UKSC 5, [2017] HRLR 2, paras. 47-48, 67-68, 81, 86-88, 93, 101. 
77 R. (on the application of Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European 
Union [2017] UKSC 5, [2017] HRLR 2, para. 49. 
78 A. Tomkins (2005) Our Republican Constitution (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: 
Hart Publishing), p. 132, is in favour of the abolition of all prerogative powers of the 
Crown by Parliament. 
79 Ch. de Montesquieu (1977) The Spirit of Laws, ed. D. W. Carrithers (Berkeley: 
University of California Press), Book 11, chapter 6, pp. 202, 213. 
80 The English Parliament itself embodied the executive (King-in-Parliament) and had 
a judicial role as a high court of justice, see Loughlin, Ref. 45, pp. 247-251. The 
Supreme Court in R. (on the application of Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the 
European Union [2017] UKSC 5, [2017] HRLR 2, para. 41, sets out the British 
constitutional system in a modern way with a clear separation of powers – an example 
of the versatility of the British constitution which allows for a wide variety of 
interpretations.  
81 As enacted by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, s. 23. 
82 A. H. Müller (2006) Die Elemente der Staatskunst, vol. 1 (Hildesheim, Zürich, New 
York: Georg Olms Verlag) (facsimile reprint of the 1809 edition), pp. XVIII-XIX 
(own translation). 
83 A big difference is that Müller was a representative of the Romantic period, while 
de Maistre detested Romanticism and adhered to ideals of classicism, see I. Berlin 
(1991) Joseph de Maistre and the Origins of Fascism, in The Crooked Timber of 
Humanity, H. Hardy (ed.) (London: Fontana Press), pp. 91-174, at p. 93. 
84  L. M. Principe (2013) The Secrets of Alchemy (Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press), pp. 83, 89, 116, 160, 168-169. 
85 See J. Goldsworthy (2002) The Sovereignty of Parliament. History and Philosophy 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press), pp. 247, 254, discussing the relevance of an official 
consensus on principles such as democracy, justice and the rule of law on the validity 
and the enforcement of statues passed by Parliament. The opinion of UK 
constitutional lawyers is that democracy is a fundamental principle of the UK 
constitution, e.g. M. Elliott (2015) The Principle of Parliamentary Sovereignty in 
Legal, Constitutional, and Political Perspective, in J. Jowell, D. Oliver, C. O’Cinneide 
(eds), The Changing Constitution, 8th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 38-
66, at p. 43. This view is naïve. 
86 The traditional ceremony of the Queen’s speech in Parliament would be a good 
example. 
87 P. Craig, G. De Búrca (2015) EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, 6th ed. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press), pp. 119-123. 
 30 
                                                                                                                                           
88 A. Follesdal, S. Hix (2006) Why there is a democratic deficit in the EU, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 44(3), pp. 533–562, at pp. 534-537. 
89 E.g. Gabriela Baczynska, Lidia Kelly, Poland could be stripped of EU voting rights 
after abolishing judiciary’s independence, The Independent, 20 July 2017. 
90 The European Conservatives and Reformists Group, see e.g. http://ecrgroup.eu/ and 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4665818.stm (22 June 2009) (both visited 17 
Jan. 2018). 
91  See also F. A. R. Bennion (2009) Understanding Common Law Legislation. 
Drafting and Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 7, 15. 
92 A. Rahmatian (2004) Codification of Private Law in Scotland: Observations by a 
Civil Lawyer, 8 Edinburgh Law Review, pp. 28-56, at p. 52. 
93 Loughlin (Ref. 45, p. 271) discusses the view that parliamentary sovereignty is a 
creature of the common law and its detailed contents and limits are ascertained by the 
courts. 
94 Sir Roger Scruton, in a BBC Radio 4 interview with Patrick Wright in the broadcast 
‘The English Fix’, 14 September 2017 (own transcription, minutes 7:41-9:18), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b0939wgl (accessed 17 Jan. 2018). 
95  E.g. H. Coing (1973) Roman Law as Ius Commune on the Continent, Law 
Quarterly Review, 89, pp. 505-517, at p. 515; H. Coing (1985) Europäisches 
Privatrecht, Vol. I (München: C. H. Beck), p. 7; R. Zimmermann (1996), Savigny’s 
Legacy. Legal History, Comparative Law, and the Emergence of a European Legal 
Science, Law Quarterly Review, 112, pp. 576-605, at pp. 581, 588-589, 591, 596-598, 
602. 
96 E.g. P. Caroni (1994) Der Schiffbruch der Geschichtlichkeit. Anmerkungen zum 
Neo-Pandektismus (Diskussion), Zeitschrift für Neuere Rechtsgeschichte, 16, pp. 85-
100, at pp. 90, 98; W. Brauneder (1997) Europäisches Privatrecht: Historische 
Wirklichkeit oder zeitbedingter Wunsch an die Geschichte? (Roma: Centro di studi e 
ricerche di diritto comparato e straniero: Saggi, Conferenze e Seminari, vol. 23), pp. 
1-22, at pp. 4-7, 8-9, 19. On that discussion, see also A. Rahmatian (2007) Friedrich 
Carl v. Savigny’s Beruf and Volksgeistlehre, The Journal of Legal History, 28, pp. 1-
29, at pp. 19-20. 
97  Brief introduction in English in Rahmatian (Ref. 92, p. 32-33) with further 
references. 
98 W. Ogris (1975) Die Rechtsentwicklung in Österreich 1848-1918 (Wien: Verlag 
der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften), p. 57; Th. Mayer-Maly (1980) 
Zeiller, as ABGB und wir, in: W. Selb and H. Hofmeister (eds), Forschungsband 
Franz von Zeiller (1751-1828) (Wien, Graz, Köln: Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger), pp. 
1-13, at p. 10; K. Zweigert and H. Kötz (1998) Introduction to Comparative Law, 3rd 
ed., Tony Weir (trans.) (Oxford: Clarendon Press), pp. 158-160. See W. Wagner 
(1980) Die Privatisierung des Lehnrechts, in: W. Selb and H. Hofmeister (eds), 
Forschungsband Franz von Zeiller (1751-1828) (Wien, Graz, Köln: Hermann 
Böhlaus Nachfolger), pp. 226-247, at pp. 238, 240, on the removal of feudal law from 
general private law in the ABGB. See also § 1 of the General Civil Code (ABGB). 
99 The application of the special rules on the fideicommissum (§ 618 ABGB) – most 
important for the nobility – became restricted during the nineteenth century, but these 
rules were repealed only in 1938. The feudal system itself was abolished in Austria-
Hungary in 1867, see Ogris (Ref. 98, pp. 64-65. 
100 E.g. J. E. Wilson (2016) India Conquered: Britain’s Raj and the Chaos of Empire 
(London: Simon and Schuster), pp. 310, 313-314. Even Indian judges administering 
 31 
                                                                                                                                           
the law alongside their British colleagues felt that and were not really equal partners, 
ibid., at p. 315. 
101 M. Chanock (1998) Law, Custom and Social Order. The Colonial Experience in 
Malawi and Zambia (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann), pp. 46, 55, 71, 75, 77-78. More 
cautiously H. F. Morris (1972) The Framework of Indirect Rule in East Africa, in: H. 
F. Morris and J. S. Read, Indirect Rule and the Search for Justice (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press), pp. 3-40, pp. 8, 24; J. S. Read (1972) Customary Law under Colonial Rule, in: 
H. F. Morris and J. S. Read, Indirect Rule and the Search for Justice (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press), pp. 169-170, 175, 183, 207, 212. 
102 See also A. Tomkins (2014) Scotland’s Choice, Britain’s Future, Law Quarterly 
Review, 130, pp. 215-234, at p. 219. Or the term ‘asymmetrical quasi-federalism’ is 
used, see R. Rawlings (2015) A Coalition Government in Westminster, in: J. Jowell, 
D. Oliver, C. O’Cinneide (eds), The Changing Constitution, 8th ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press), pp. 194-221, p. 218. 
103 Scotland Act 1998, ss. 1, 28-29. According to Ch. Himsworth, Ch. O’Neill (2009) 
Scotland’s Constitution: Law and Practice (Haywards Heath: Bloomsbury 
Professional), p. 14), ‘that Act can quite reasonably be described as a constitution for 
Scotland’. Contrary view in Imperial Tobacco Ltd. v. Lord Advocate [2012] CSIH 9, 
para. 71.  
104 See, however, the discussion by J. St. Mill on federal systems in the nineteenth 
century, J. St. Mill (1998) Considerations on Representative Government, in: J. S. 
Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays, J. Gray (ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 
ch. 17, pp. 203-467, at p. 437. 
105 That is the terminology of the Scotland Act 1998, see s. 29(2). See also N. Aroney 
(2014) Reserved Matters, Legislative Purpose and the Referendum on Scottish 
Independence, Public Law, pp. 422-445, at p. 423-424. 
106 For example: Northern Region – parliament in Manchester, Midlands – parliament 
in Birmingham, and so on. 
107 On the conflict of regional legislative powers with parliamentary sovereignty, see 
e.g. A. Tomkins (1999) Of Constitutional Spectres, Public Law, pp. 525-540, at p. 
534; Tomkins, Ref. 102, pp. 218, 220. See also Walker, Ref. 55, p. 544: ‘absence of a 
formal federal system’; Aroney, Ref. 105, p. 428: ‘the United Kingdom is certainly 
not a modern federal state’. 
108 D. Willoweit (2009) Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte, 6th ed. (München: C. H. 
Beck), p. 148. 
109 See H. Mitteis (1953) Der Staat des Hohen Mittelalters, 4th ed. (Weimar: Hermann 
Böhlaus Nachfolger), pp. 67, 256-257, 341, in relation to a possible origin of this 
evolution in feudal law. Modern scholarship has, however, qualified and partly 
rejected the (ahistorical) interpretation by older scholars, such as Mitteis, of possible 
different features of the French and the German feudal system in view of the later 
development of the nation state, see St. Patzold (2012) Das Lehnswesen (München: C. 
H. Beck), pp. 96-102. Brief discussion also in A. Rahmatian (2015) Lord Kames: 
Legal and Social Theorist (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press), pp. 198-199, 
260. 
110 European Union (Withdrawal) Bill (HC Bill 5), s. 11 (1) (a) and (b). See J. Hunt 
(2017) Devolution, in: M. Dougan (ed.), The UK after Brexit: Legal and Policy 
Changes (Cambridge-Antwerp-Portland: Intersentia), pp. 35-52, at pp. 47-48. 
111 R. (on the application of Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European 
Union [2017] UKSC 5, [2017] HRLR 2, para. 150. 
 32 
                                                                                                                                           
112 That is also the concept of the Scotland Act 1998, s. 28(7): ‘This section does not 
affect the power of the Parliament of the United Kingdom to make laws for Scotland.’ 
See also the White Paper Scotland’s Parliament in 1997, Cm 3658, para. 42. 
113 Dicey, Ref. 58, p. 65, said about certain Acts, such as the Act of Union with 
Scotland of 1706, that they were ‘intended to give to certain portions of them more 
than the ordinary effect of statutes’, but showed that the British Parliament made 
amendments to the Act of Union and similar Acts subsequently, so this intention has 
no legal effect. 
114  Scotland Act 1998, s. 63A (1) The Scottish Parliament and the Scottish 
Government are a permanent part of the United Kingdom’s constitutional 
arrangements. … (3) … it is declared that the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish 
Government are not to be abolished except on the basis of a decision of the people of 
Scotland voting in a referendum. 
115 R. (on the application of Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European 
Union [2017] UKSC 5, [2017] HRLR 2, para. 149. 
116 R. v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd. (No. 2) [1991] 1 
AC 603. See e.g. Craig and De Búrca, Ref. 87, pp. 116-119. 
See also Tomkins, Ref. 102, p. 216, on the Claim of Right of the Scottish 
Constitutional Convention in 1989 as an attempt to establish ‘constituent power’. 
118 Scotland’s Future: Your Guide to an independent Scotland, Scottish Government, 
November 2013. 
119  Scotland’s Future: Your Guide to an independent Scotland, p. 351. Other 
important passages are at pp. 22, 338, 351-370. 
120 A small inclination towards federalism is the insertion of ss. (8) to s. 28 of the 
Scotland Act 1998 by the Scotland Act 2016 (Sewel convention): ‘But it is recognised 
that the Parliament of the United Kingdom will not normally legislate with regard to 
devolved matters without the consent of the Scottish Parliament.’ However, criteria 
like ‘recognised’, ‘not normally’ and just ‘consent’ are still unacceptable to a modern 
federal constitutional system. 
121 For Germany, see German Basic Law 1949, Art. 31. For Austria (in relation to the 
state constitutions), see Constitution of 1920/1929, Art. 99 (1). 
122 Scotland Act 1998, s. 30, Schedule 5. This was also a reason why the Government 
enabled the Scottish Parliament to pass the Scottish Independence Referendum Act 
2013 to ensure the legal basis of the referendum by having the Queen approving (with 
prior approval of both Houses of Parliament) an Order in Council: The Scotland Act 
1998 (Modification of Schedule 5) Order 2013, 12 February 2013. See also Aroney, 
Ref. 105, pp. 423, 426. 
123  Under the Compromise, the ‘dual monarchy’ consisted of the emperor/king 
(Francis-Joseph I, until 1916, Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary), and the 
common ministers of foreign affairs, defence, and a common finance ministry solely 
for the army, navy and diplomatic expenditures. 
124 E. C. Hellbling, (1974) Österreichische Verfassungs- und Verwaltungsgeschichte, 
2nd ed. (Wien-New York: Springer Verlag), pp. 396-398; E. Zöllner (1990) 
Geschichte Österreichs, 8th ed. (Wien-München: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik-R. 
Oldenbourg Verlag), pp. 411-413. A more contemporaneous analysis of the Austro-
Hungarian Compromise by K. Renner (published under the name Rudolf Springer) 
(1906) Grundlagen und Entwicklungsziele der Österreichisch-Ungarischen 
Monarchie (Wien and Leipzig: Franz Deuticke), pp. 43-47. 
 33 
                                                                                                                                           
125 The Scottish Independence Referendum Act 2013 is silent as to the effects of the 
referendum. See also Tomkins, Ref. 102, p. 223, on the Draft Referendum Bill 
consultation paper. 
126  That was the question in the 2014 independence referendum, see Scottish 
Independence Referendum Act 2013, s. 1 (2). 
127  For example, the Spanish Constitution, as its Art. 155 shows, has no such a 
procedure, which became apparent in the Catalonia crisis in autumn 2017. The 
Canadian Supreme Court decided in the case of Quebec Secession Reference [1998] 2 
SCR 217, that such a process to secede must be constitutionally provided. 
128 See also A. McHarg, ‘The Referendum: Memorandum of Agreement and Draft 
Section 30 Order’, 16 Oct. 2012; Ch. Bell, ‘The Legal Status of the “Edinburgh 
Agreement”’, 5 Nov. 2012, both at Scottish Constitutional Futures Forum, 
http://www.scottishconstitutionalfutures.org/ (visited 17 Jan. 2018). 
129  Alasdair Fotheringham, ‘Catalonia suspends declaration of independence from 
Spain’, The Independent, 10 Oct. 2017. 
130 Scotland’s Future: Your Guide to an independent Scotland, Scottish Government, 
November 2013, pp. 22, 45. 
131 Scotland’s Future: Your Guide to an independent Scotland, pp. 13, 53, 219. 
132 M. N. Shaw (2008) International Law, 6th ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press), pp. 207, 444, 960, 974; J. R. Crawford (2007) The Creation of States in 
International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 383. Specifically with regard 
to Scotland, A. Rahmatian (2012) The English Pound in an Independent Scotland, 
Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation, 27(9), pp. 336-339, at p. 336; 
Tomkins, Ref. 102, p. 231: An independent Scotland, if recognised by the 
international community, would be a new state, having seceded from the rest of the 
UK as the continuing state. 
133 E.g. European Parliament, Parliamentary Questions, Subject: Status of the United 
Kingdom if Scotland leaves, 29 Oct. 2012, available at: 
 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=WQ&reference=P-2012-
009862&language=EN (accessed 17 Jan. 2018). Letter of the then EU Commission 
President José Manuel Barroso to Lord Tugendhat, House of Lords, 10 Dec. 2012.  
134 European Commission Statement 17/3626, 2 Oct. 2017: An independent Catalonia 
would be outside the EU. 
135  E.g. Severin Carrel, ‘It’s Scotland’s pound and we’re keeping it, says Alex 
Salmond: First minister indicates independent Scotland would use sterling even if 
formal sterling zone was rejected by UK government’, The Guardian, 7 August 2014; 
John Swinney, SNP Finance Secretary, in Eddie Barnes, The Scotsman, February 2, 
2012. Swinney also ruled out joining the euro for the foreseeable future. 
136 About Brexit: S. Coates, ‘“Have Cake and Eat it” – Aide Reveals Brexit Tactic’, 
The Times, 29 November 2016. About the Scottish independence referendum: 
Editorial, ‘Scotland cannot have it both ways: Independence involves harder choices 
than SNP admits’, Financial Times, 26 November 2013. 
137 ‘For now they are restricting themselves to propaganda and signposts in Gaelic 
that no one really needs. But as a Jew who has relatively short roots in Scotland, and 
with friends and family in England and Israel, as much as I feel Scottish on the 
outside, I fear that one day people will start asking: “How Scottish are you?”’, quoted 
in Anshel Pfeffer, ‘Jews on Scottish independence: More faintheart than Braveheart’, 
Haarez, 26 Oct. 2012. 
138 Union with Scotland Act 1706, Arts. 18, 19. 
 34 
                                                                                                                                           
139 A good summary of this movement by one of its critics, A. McCall Smith (1976) 
Scots Law in Comparative Context, in: J. P. Grant (ed.), Independence and 
Devolution. The Legal Implications for Scotland (Edinburgh: W. Green), pp. 153-161, 
at pp. 153-154. 
140 In fact, especially the provisions on moveable or personal property in the Sale of 
Goods Act clearly show Roman-law concepts and thinking. 
141 The argument is s. 17 and s. 18, rule 1 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979.  
142 J. Viscount of Stair (1981) The Institutions of the Law of Scotland, D. M. Walker 
(ed.) (Edinburgh and Glasgow: The University Presses of Edinburgh and Glasgow), 
book II, 3, 14, p. 337. 
143 Anon. (1889) Current Topics: Sale of Goods Bill, Juridical Review 1, p. 311. 
144 Austrian General Civil Code (ABGB), §§ 380, 424, 425.  
145 Compare my article (also on the value of the Austrian Civil Code for Scots law), 
Rahmatian, Ref. 92, p. 32, which had no influence in Scotland at all. 
146 This may explain why many European academics at Scottish law schools have not 
engaged much with Scots private law, as H. L. MacQueen (2017) Quo vadis?, 
Juridical Review, 1, pp. 9-19, at p. 14, remarked. 
147 Rahmatian, Ref. 96, pp. 24-25; A. Rahmatian (2007) Universalist Norms for a 
Globalised Diversity: on the Protection of Traditional Cultural Expressions, in: F. 
Macmillan (ed.) New Directions in Copyright Law, vol. 6 (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Publishing), pp. 199-231, at pp. 209-210; Rahmatian, Ref. 109, pp. 14-15; A. 
Rahmatian (2018) The political purpose of the “mixed legal system” conception in the 
law of Scotland, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (online 
preview). 
148 The national-socialist government turned the Weimar constitution ineffective by 
passing various acts under emergency legislation, starting with the Emergency Decree 
or ‘Ermächtigungsgesetz’ (Verordnung des Reichspräsidenten zum Schutz von Volk 
und Staat) of 28 February 1933 (RGBl. I S. 83). A few articles of the Weimar 
Constitution still apply, see Art. 140 German Basic Law 1949.  
149 E. Fraenkel (2010) The Dual State. A Contribution to the Theory of Dictatorship 
(Clark, NJ: Lawbook Exchange), pp. 3, 65. 
150 E.g. Federalist No. 10 (Madison), Federalist No. 19 (Madison), Federalist No. 69 
(Hamilton), see A. Hamilton, J. Madison, J. Jay (2003) The Federalist Papers (New 
York: Bantam Classic), pp. 53, 108, 418-420, 423. 
151 Craig and De Búrca, Ref. 87, pp. 8, 50-51. 
152 As also confirmed by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, s. 1. On the rule of law 
(legality, certainty, equality, access to justice for enforcement of rights), see e.g. J. 
Jowell (2015) The Rule of Law, in: J. Jowell, D. Oliver, C. O’Cinneide (eds), The 
Changing Constitution, 8th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 13-37, at pp. 
19-24. 
153  Kames (Lord Kames, Henry Home) (1763) Essays upon Several Subjects 
concerning British Antiquities, Appendix, 3rd ed. (Edinburgh: A. Kincaid and J. Bell), 
pp. 201, 203 (emphasis added). The text was first published in 1747. Here cited after 
the 3rd ed. of 1763: the passage ‘which is that of self-preservation’ was added in the 
1763 edition. 
